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ABSTRACT: Extrapolation of causal claims from study populations to other populations of interest is 
a problematic issue. The standard approach in experimental research, which prioritises randomized con-
trolled trials and statistical evidence, is not devoid of difficulties. Granted that, it has been defended that 
evidence of mechanisms is indispensable for causal extrapolation. We argue, contrarily, that this sort of 
evidence is not indispensable. Nonetheless, we also think that occasionally it may be helpful. In order to 
clarify its relevance, we introduce a distinction between a positive and a negative role of evidence of me-
chanisms. Our conclusion is that the former is highly questionable, but the latter may be a trustworthy re-
source for causal extrapolation.
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dence; external validity; randomized controlled trial.
RESUMEN: La extrapolación de relaciones causales de poblaciones de estudio a otras poblaciones de interés 
es una cuestión problemática. El procedimiento estándar en investigación experimental, el cual prioriza los en-
sayos controlados aleatorizados y la evidencia estadística, no está carente de dificultades. Dada esta situación, 
se ha planteado que la evidencia de mecanismos es indispensable para la extrapolación causal. Nosotros argu-
mentamos que, por el contrario, este tipo de evidencia no es indispensable. Sin embargo, pensamos que puede 
ser de ayuda en ciertas ocasiones. Para clarificar su relevancia, distinguimos entre el rol positivo y el rol nega-
tivo de la evidencia de mecanismos. Nuestra conclusión es que el primero es altamente cuestionable, pero el se-
gundo puede ser un recurso fiable para la extrapolación.
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1. Introduction
The relevance of mechanisms in science has been advocated by many scientists and philos-
ophers of science (see Glennan, 2017; Glennan & Illari, 2018). This relevance is associated 
with several issues such as scientific explanation (Machamer et al., 2000; Bechtel & Abra-
hamsen, 2005; Hedström, 2005; Glennan, 2017), scientific inquiry (Bechtel & Richard-
son, 1993; Darden, 2018), knowledge growth and organization (Hedström & Ylikoski, 
2010; Glennan, 2017), integration of different fields (Craver & Alexandrova, 2008), and 
establishment of causal claims (Steel, 2004; Russo & Williamson, 2007; Glennan, 2017). 
Over the last decade, the role of evidence of mechanisms in extrapolating causal claims 
from study populations to other populations of interest has also been a matter of conten-
tion (Steel, 2008; Clarke et al., 2013, 2014; Howick et al., 2013a, 2013b; Parkkinen et al., 
2018; Marchionni & Reijula, 2019; Anjum et al., 2020).
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of evidence of mechanisms in extrapolation 
and to evaluate whether, as some authors have defended, it is indispensable for legitimately 
extrapolating a causal claim. We will argue that, although it is not indispensable, evidence 
of mechanisms can be a valuable resource for causal extrapolation. The structure of the pa-
per is as follows. Section 2 examines and discusses the “indispensability thesis” about evi-
dence of mechanisms. Firstly, the main shortcomings confronted by the standard statistical 
approach (i.e. the absence of universal responses and the context-variance) are introduced 
(subsection 2.1). Subsequently, after characterising evidence of mechanisms, it is claimed 
that it is not indispensable for addressing those difficulties. Evidence of mechanisms is not 
required for dealing with the heterogeneity of responses (subsection 2.2) and is also be-
set by contextual variability (subsection 2.3). After establishing the non-indispensability 
of evidence of mechanisms, section 3 discusses its appropriate role in causal extrapolation. 
For that purpose, a distinction between a positive and a negative role of evidence of mecha-
nisms is introduced. It is argued that the negative role of evidence of mechanisms is reliable 
and valuable for causal extrapolation (subsection 3.1), while the actual relevance of the pos-
itive role is, at the very least, uncertain (subsection 3.2).
2. Statistical evidence and evidence of mechanisms
Extrapolation of causal claims is usually linked to “external validity” in literature on scien-
tific methodology. It is contrasted with internal validity. The latter “refers to the approxi-
mate validity with which we infer that a relationship between two variables is causal or that 
the absence of a relationship implies the absence of cause”, while external validity “refers to 
the approximate validity with which we can infer that the presumed causal relationship can 
be generalized to and across alternate measures of the cause and effect and across different 
types of persons, settings, and times” (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p. 37).1
Concerning extrapolation, then, we should distinguish the study and the target popu-
lations. They are, in fact, different populations and extrapolations from the former to the 
1 Although this distinction is deeply rooted in the methodological discussion, some critical voices are 
also present. See, for instance, Jiménez-Buedo & Miller (2010) and Reiss (2019).
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latter are justified insofar as they resemble each other (or alternatively, insofar as they do 
not differ significantly). The fundamental question raised by causal extrapolation is, then, 
how we know that those populations are similar in the relevant respects (i.e. those factors 
which could have a non-negligible effect on the results obtained in the study population).
2.1. Extrapolation based on statistical evidence
The standard statistical approach invokes randomized control trials (RCTs) for discerning 
causal relations in the study population. Both randomization and comparison between two 
subpopulations (the control group and the experimental group) are the strategies favoured 
by RCTs.
Experimental group (P1, P2, P3… Pn)
Study population
Control group (¬P1, P2, P3… Pn)
Experimental design according to RCTs looks for subpopulations which differ only in the 
alleged causal factor (P1, in this case). Random assignment justifies neutralization of those 
variables (Pi) apart from P1 which could also be causally relevant for the dependent vari-
able Q—i.e., the investigated effect. The necessary assumption here is that the statistical 
distribution of those variables which could affect Q apart from P1 is the same (or nearly 
the same) in both subpopulations. Otherwise, significant differences discovered on Q-fre-
quencies could be considered a consequence not just of switching ¬P1 to P1 in the control 
and the experimental group respectively, but a consequence of any of those other —be it 
known or unknown— underlying variables which could have an influence on Q. Then, af-
ter intervention, that is, after switching ¬P1 to P1, differences in Q-frequencies obtained in 
both subpopulations should be considered as a consequence exclusively of P1. It should be 
added that different experiments —with different study populations— occasionally give 
similar results. After all, systematic reviews which encompass several RCTs, also labelled 
as “meta-analyses”, are the highest ranked sort of evidence in most hierarchies of evidence.2
Sometimes it is not possible to resort to RCTs due to practical or ethical reasons. 
Then, “quasi-experimental” designs (prospective cohort-studies, retrospective case-studies, 
etc.), in which randomization is absent and study populations are “real”, are used. Even for 
scientific fields which ubiquitously lean on statistical evidence that may be the usual pre-
dicament. Epidemiology is a good example. By and large we cannot intervene to induce dis-
2 The GRADE (Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation) approach in 
medicine and public health gives this recommendation: “Ideally, evidence profiles should be used to 
assess the certainty in the evidence and these should be based on systematic reviews” (GRADE work-
ing group, 2016). The European Parliament Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating 
to medicinal products for human use is very clear in favouring RCTs: “In general, clinical trials shall 
be done as ‘controlled clinical trials’ and if possible, randomized; any other design shall be justified.” 
(Annex I, part 4). And there are more examples: for instance, those of the UK National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (2006), the CONSORT (Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials) 
Group (2010), the Oxford Centre for Evidence-based Medicine (2011), and the Scottish Intercollegi-
ate Guidelines Network (2019). 
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eases on humans so we must rely on quasi-experimental designs. RCTs on animals could 
overcome these ethical concerns, but then the issue is precisely extrapolating those results 
to humans. Nevertheless, since our target here is not detection (of causal relationships), but 
extrapolation, we will assume that a fairly good control on confounding variables may often 
be obtained and, consequently, that we can get conclusive reasons in favour of causal rela-
tionships by means of those quasi-experimental designs.3
Now the question is to what extent those results based on statistical frequencies could 
be reliably extrapolated to a different population (the target population). The short answer 
is that they can be extrapolated if the study and the target population are similar enough. 
From this point of view, the question is the same no matter if we depart from statistical ev-
idence or evidence of mechanisms, that is, to justify the similarity assumption. The specific 
problem, however, is whether the statistical information about the study population over-
looks what could be relevant differences between it and the target population so that the 
extrapolation is unreliable.
It is worth adding that we are not concerned here with deficiencies found in particu-
lar investigations due to practical constraints (funding, time, suitable training for human 
resources…). Rather, we should try to discern intrinsic limitations for statistical evidence 
about extrapolation which do not depend on these practical concerns. Those limitations 
usually invoked are related, firstly, to the assumption that there is a “universal response”, 
and secondly, to the differences between the respective contexts of both populations.
Extrapolating from RCTs (or quasi-experimental designs) assumes “universal re-
sponse”, that is, that different individuals (or groups of individuals) will respond to an in-
tervention, treatment, or drug in the same way. It is claimed that that assumption may be 
justified for “interventions with short causal pathways” at most, but it is highly debatable 
about “interventions involving long, complex causal pathways, or in large-scale evaluations 
where these pathways can be affected by numerous characteristics of the population, health 
system, or environment” (Victora et al., 2004, p. 402). An example is that of an antihyper-
tensive treatment sensitive to the ethnicity of the patient. RCTs were developed in dif-
ferent ethnic groups and the design was motivated because of “plentiful evidence suggest-
ing the operation of different pro-hypertensive mechanisms operating in different ethnic 
groups” (Clarke et al., 2014, p. 347).
Furthermore, the study population is very frequently analysed in artificial or unrealis-
tic conditions while the target population is “in the real world”. Then, to what extent can 
we expect that those results obtained in artificial conditions will be preserved in real pop-
ulations? The fact that humans know that they are under experimental treatment could 
have distorting effects on the results. More importantly, extrapolation from in vitro trials 
to in vivo conditions about the effectiveness of a treatment demands mathematical mod-
els (IVIVC = in vitro/in vivo correlations) to relate in vitro effects to in vivo responses 
(Bell et  al., 2018). Concerning health policies, effective implementation may be trouble-
some. For instance, doses are precisely prescribed in experimental conditions (quantity and 
times), but the real situations to apply the treatment to patients are not so well-defined or 
3 We will not distinguish here between “detecting a cause-effect relationship” and “assessing the effect 
size”. However, see Kincaid (2012) for some limitations of multiple regression analysis concerning the 
latter. 
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so controlled as those in the laboratory. The fact is that this sort of context-variance may 
put at risk extrapolations based on those correlations found in an experimental setting.4
Given this scenario, some scientists and philosophers of science consider that study-
to-target causal inferences based on statistical evidence alone are not reliable and, conse-
quently, that a different sort of evidence (i.e. evidence of mechanisms) should be taken into 
account to ground them.
2.2. The “indispensability thesis” about evidence of mechanisms
The “indispensability thesis” about evidence of mechanisms claims that evidence of mech-
anisms is required in order to make a reliable causal inference (Russo & Williamson, 2007; 
Clarke et al., 2013, 2014; Parkkinen et al., 2018). Evidence of mechanisms is defined as ev-
idence about the existence or the properties of mechanisms in the domain of inquiry ( Illari, 
2011). In that approach, a broad view of mechanisms is taken (Aronson et al., 2018; Parkki-
nen et al., 2018). Although a mechanism must be a real entity in the world, it can be a complex 
system (Illari & Williamson, 2012), a causal process (Salmon, 1998), or some combination of 
both. Moreover, there is no specific kind of evidence-gathering method through which evi-
dence of mechanisms must be obtained. A wide variety of methods are considered legitimate, 
including case reports, autopsies, cohort studies, simulations, in vitro experiments, and RCTs.5
The underlying rationale of indispensability is that statistical evidence and evidence of 
mechanisms must be integrated in order to obtain reliable causal inferences. It is maintained 
that statistical evidence and evidence of mechanisms complement each other. Statistical ev-
idence has some intrinsic limitations that require evidence of mechanisms to be overcome, 
and vice versa. Advocates of that approach claim that, in order to establish that A is a cause 
of B in a study population, it must be ascertained that they are correlated and also that there 
is an underlying mechanism that explains that correlation (Russo & Williamson, 2007; 
Clarke et al., 2014). According to them, statistical evidence may successfully assess the net 
effect of the mechanism linking A and B, but it can hardly deal with shortcomings related 
to confounding factors and non-causal correlations. On the other hand, evidence of mecha-
nisms is appropriate to cope with the latter difficulties, but it cannot assess the net effect of 
the involved mechanism. Furthermore, it is claimed that the demand of both statistical evi-
dence and evidence of mechanisms is supported by medical methodology, uses of causality, 
and several instances of causal discovery (Clarke et al., 2014).
Regarding causal extrapolation, advocates of the indispensability thesis maintain that, 
in order to extrapolate a causal claim from a study population to a different target popula-
tion, one needs to establish similarity of relevant mechanisms in both populations (Clarke 
et al., 2014; Parkkinen et al., 2018; Williamson, 2019). Those authors claim that establish-
ing similarity of relevant mechanisms in the study and target populations is analogous to 
4 Regarding the social sciences (especially evidence-based policy), Cartwright (2012) has argued that, 
even when the study population is “in the real world”, differences in the context (e.g. cultural differ-
ences) between the study and the target population may undermine the extrapolation. 
5 It should be noted that the distinction between statistical evidence and evidence of mechanisms is a 
distinction about objects of evidence, not about evidence-gathering methods. In fact, as Illari has ar-
gued, “there is no principled distinction between the kinds of empirical work by which we get evidence 
of mechanisms, and evidence of difference-making” (2011, p. 145).
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establishing the existence of both a correlation and an underlying mechanism that explains 
it in the target population. They consider that “[b]y means of this similarity of mecha-
nisms, one can use the claim that A is a cause of B established in the source population 
to further support the correlation claim in the target population” (Williamson, 2019, p. 
53). In order to confirm the similarity of the relevant mechanisms, it is required to estab-
lish that in the target population there is a mechanism similar to the mechanism of action 
identified in the study population and there is no counteracting mechanism that masks its 
effect. That procedure involves both statistical evidence and evidence of mechanisms. Evi-
dence of mechanisms can address the similarity between the mechanisms of action, but it 
can hardly rule out the existence of counteracting mechanisms. On the other hand, statisti-
cal evidence can rule out the existence of counteracting mechanisms, but it cannot address 
the similarity between the mechanisms of action.
It is time now to scrutinize those arguments presented in subsection 2.1 against the re-
liability of extrapolations based on statistical evidence, i.e., the “universal response” and the 
“context-variance” arguments. In the remainder of section 2, we will discuss whether evi-
dence of mechanisms is required to overcome those difficulties —i.e., whether it effectively 
complements statistical evidence— and, consequently, whether the standard statistical ap-
proach should be somehow supplemented by considering evidence of mechanisms. Let us 
begin with the absence of universal responses.
It may be acknowledged that evidence of mechanisms is very useful to specify subpopula-
tions within the target population with different responses to the intervention. Recall the ex-
ample mentioned in the previous subsection. The effectiveness of a hypertensive prevention 
health policy may be increased on the basis of that kind of knowledge. Evidence of mecha-
nisms pointed at ethnic differences as a crucial factor and RCTs should not overlook this fact. 
It is fair to say that, in order to minimize the potential heterogeneity of the treatment’s ef-
fects, different strategies to design trials have been developed: subgroup analysis, latent classes 
analysis (LCA)... (see below). Nevertheless, the role played by evidence of mechanisms in 
those strategies is similar to that played by background knowledge. It may be relevant to de-
fine the sample space, i.e., the content of those hypotheses which would be tested. Hence, in 
the previous example, a sensible RCT should include two groups —the experimental and the 
control group— which differ in ethnicity. But after then, frequencies would still be decisive 
since the goal is to check if there are statistically significant differences between both groups.
Then, it is worthwhile to distinguish between two different roles for evidence: the test-
ing role —in an RCT, the frequencies obtained— and the heuristic role —i.e., that evidence 
not provided by the experiment itself but invoked to devise the sample space where testing 
takes place. The experiment’s outcome is the testing evidence for the causal hypothesis at 
issue, but the information previously taken into account for devising the experiment does 
not play the same role. Statistical evidence plays a testing role in RCTs, while the evidence 
of mechanisms incorporated when setting the sample space fulfils a heuristic role. Occa-
sionally evidence of mechanisms may be very helpful, yes, but it should be remarked that 
here we are interested in the evidential support for our extrapolations, and not in how to 
devise an experiment.
We extrapolate a causal hypothesis provided that the testing evidence obtained in the 
experiment supports it. To insist that evidence of mechanisms could play a heuristic role 
in experimental design does not ground by itself pluralists’ claim for indispensability. It 
should be emphasized that sometimes background knowledge also plays that very same 
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role and it is not necessarily knowledge of mechanisms; it may be about previous known 
frequencies, expert judgment, common medical lore, etc. Common medical lore, for in-
stance, may be based on very rough empirical generalizations. Properly speaking, this is not 
statistical evidence. But neither is it evidence of mechanisms. And the same could be said 
for some other sources of evidence (analogical reasoning from animals, biopsies…). Particu-
larly, subgroup analysis is a standard statistical procedure where suspicious variables should 
be included as predictors (see Rothwell, 2005b). LCA is a further option where subgroups 
are established after some empirical data are gathered (Magidson & Vermunt, 2005). Both 
strategies rely, to a greater or lesser extent, on pertinent background knowledge but neither 
of them necessitates that it includes evidence of mechanisms.
Accordingly, since evidence of mechanisms is not the only option to avoid hasty gener-
alizations —i.e., a “universal response”— the indispensability claim in favour of evidence of 
mechanisms does not follow from the fact that occasionally this sort of evidence is consid-
ered for setting the sample space.
Turning now to the “context-variance” argument, insofar as randomization and high 
control of potential distorting influences are defining features of RCTs, evidence provided 
by them is obtained in highly artificial conditions. Things could be different in a real sce-
nario, after all, and even though several strategies have been developed in statistical practice 
for coping with this question, neither of them a priori guarantees that extrapolation will be 
successful.6 It should be reminded that evidence of mechanisms is presumably indispensa-
ble insofar as it compensates the intrinsic limitations of statistical evidence. And here we 
have an essential feature —the contrast between artificial and natural conditions— of the 
supposedly best statistical evidence we can get, i.e., that obtained in RCTs.
However, what are the prospects of avoiding the perils of context-variance by resort-
ing to evidence of mechanisms? First of all, it is worth pointing out that evidence of mech-
anisms may be obtained from different sources. If it is recorded in a laboratory setting, we 
are in a parallel case to that of RCTs. It could also be obtained from case studies—autop-
sies, for instance. But, analogously, the degree of intervention when correlations are in-
volved may vary. RCTs, observational and cohort studies, retrospective studies… offer a 
continuous range of options from more artificial to more “real world” conditions. Artifi-
ciality can hardly be considered, then, as a distinctive feature of statistical evidence when 
compared to evidence of mechanisms. Besides, even if we accept that getting statistical ev-
idence involves, by and large, a more noticeable degree of intervention than evidence of 
mechanisms, context-variance could still be no less of a threat to evidence of mechanisms, 
as we will argue in the next subsection.
2.3. Mechanisms, extrapolation, and context-variance
The study and the target populations are, in fact, different populations. The question is 
how do we know that those populations are similar —or alternatively, that they do not dif-
fer— in the relevant respects, that is, in those factors which could have a non-negligible ef-
fect on the results obtained with the study population.
6 Two-stage designs, which involve over-sampling on the study population, is one example of such a 
strategy. See Rothman et al. (2008), chaps. 8 and 15, for further details.
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From this point of view, the problem for both advocates of the standard statistical ap-
proach and those who underline the relevance of evidence of mechanisms is to justify the 
similarity claim. Trialists’ efforts in RCTs are aimed at neutralizing those well-known fac-
tors which may bias the results (doctor-patient relationship, patient preference, and pla-
cebo effects). Blinded treatment allocation, exclusion of patients or clinicians with strong 
preferences, and placebo control are routinely applied. These issues are primarily related to 
internal validity but, as might be expected, there may be unsurmountable obstacles for full 
control on these factors outside trials, that is, in real-world situations.7 As the difficulties 
for neutralizing potentially biasing factors increase, the distance between the experimen-
tal population and the target population grows and the extrapolation claim gets riskier. All 
these complications demand caution in extrapolation, certainly. However, study-to-target 
extrapolations based on statistical evidence assume that both populations are similar, or at 
least, that they are not so dissimilar as to cast doubt on the inferences obtained in the study 
population.
On the other hand, mechanism-based extrapolations demand that mechanisms simi-
lar (in the relevant aspects) to the relevant mechanisms operating in the study population 
are present in the target population.8 Let S = study population, T = target population, and 
three indexed variables: Ii for interventions in those populations, Mi for mechanisms oper-
ating in them, and Oi for the respective outcomes of interventions. Suppose that we have 
good evidence that a particular intervention I1 brings about O1 through M1 in S. Then, a 
causal relationship between I1 and O1 has been ascertained in S. Nonetheless, for a reasona-
ble mechanism-based extrapolation, it would also be required that a mechanism similar to 
M1 in the relevant aspects is present in T.
Steel (2008) has suggested a particular procedure (“comparative process tracing”) to 
compare mechanisms operating in both populations and to discern their similarity. Given 
our limited knowledge about the mechanisms at work, it has been argued that comparative 
process tracing is usually unfeasible (Reiss, 2010; Howick et  al., 2013b; van Eersel et  al., 
2019). We will not discuss Steel’s proposal here (see section 3). Nevertheless, even if it is 
verified that a mechanism similar to M1 in the relevant aspects is present in T, contextual 
variation may undermine the causal extrapolation.
In the first place, consider the so-called problem of masking (Clarke et al., 2013, 2014; 
van Eersel et al., 2019). In the target population, there may be unknown disturbing mech-
anisms that influence the outcome. Even if a mechanism similar enough to M1 is present in 
T, there may be unknown mechanisms that affect the outcome and, eventually, mask its in-
fluence. Those unknown disturbing mechanisms could even interfere with the identified 
mechanism and undermine its own contribution to the outcome.
The challenge posed by masking could be illustrated by means of the relationship be-
tween exercise and weight loss.9 In a study population whose eating habits are regulated 
7 Rothwell (2005a) offers detailed recommendations to minimize the risk when extrapolating RCTs re-
sults to particular clinical settings in daily practice. 
8 A mechanism (or an aspect of a mechanism) is considered relevant for a causal relationship in a par-
ticular population if a change on it could make a difference to whether the causal relationship holds in 
that population (see Steel, 2008, p. 89).
9 Here we add minor variations on an example discussed in several places. See, for instance, Steel (2008) 
p. 68 and Clarke et al. (2014) p. 351. 
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(e.g. a military unit), it is the case that additional physical exercise causes more calories to 
be burned and results in weight-loss. However, in a target population whose eating habits 
are not regulated, a disturbing mechanism may hinder the loss of weight. Consider, for in-
stance, people who suffer from knee pain. Prescription of adequate physical exercise to lose 
weight is recommended in order to alleviate that physical discomfort. However, provided 
that physical exercise stimulates appetite and that there is no regulation on eating habits, 
increase in caloric intake could minimize the expected weight loss —it could even bring 
about the opposite effect, that is, increasing weight gain— in the target population.
Secondly, mechanisms’ absence of regularity should not be overlooked (Howick et al., 
2010, 2013b; van Eersel et al., 2019). Similar mechanisms may be present in the study and 
the target populations, but not behave in a similar way. Even if a mechanism similar to M1 
in several relevant aspects is present in T, it may have unanticipated and paradoxical ef-
fects in that population. Absence of regularity in mechanisms is of particular concern when 
the study population is artificially built in the laboratory. The fact is that the behaviour of 
a mechanism in the laboratory may differ significantly from its behaviour in a real setting 
(Howick et al., 2013a, 2013b). By way of illustration, consider the following example about 
non-selective β agonists:
Given that β1 and β2 adrenoceptors are present in both the heart and the vasculature, and 
the existence of various neurally mediated systemic baroreflex functions, it is not surprising that 
the integrated response at the level of the individual to non-selective β agonists such as isoprena-
line (isoproterenol) may be hypertension or hypotension and tachycardia or bradycardia. (Smith 
et al., 2012, p. 178)
Given that, contextual variance seems as dangerous at least for evidence of mechanisms 
as it is for statistical evidence. Admittedly, there may be great differences about the poten-
tial effect of contextual variation in causal extrapolations, whether extrapolations are based 
on statistical evidence or evidence of mechanisms. A case-by-case scrutiny seems mandatory 
here. Nevertheless, we think that those considerations introduced in subsections 2.2 and 
2.3 do suffice to discard the alleged complementarity afforded by evidence of mechanisms 
with respect to statistical evidence. Provided that complementarity is the main rationale to 
consider that evidence of mechanisms is necessary in study-to-target causal extrapolation, 
we conclude that the indispensability thesis should be put aside. Our conclusion, nonethe-
less, does not entail that evidence of mechanisms has no role to play when causal extrapola-
tion is at issue.
3. The (non-indispensable) role of evidence of mechanisms
Evidence of mechanisms is not indispensable for the extrapolation of causal claims. As it 
has been argued, it is not necessary for dealing with the heterogeneity of responses and is 
hardly able to address the variance resulting from differences in the context. However, this 
does not entail that evidence of mechanisms is irrelevant or useless for causal extrapolation. 
In fact, most authors, including those who do not endorse the indispensability thesis, agree 
that evidence of mechanisms could be a valuable resource (Howick et  al., 2013a, 2013b; 
Parkkinen et al., 2018; Marchionni & Reijula, 2019; Anjum et al., 2020). The aim of this 
section is to discuss the proper role of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation. For 
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that purpose, a distinction between a positive and a negative role of evidence of mecha-
nisms in causal extrapolation will be introduced.
In the literature about the contribution of evidence of mechanisms for establishing 
causal claims in study populations, a distinction is often made between a positive and a neg-
ative role (Steel, 2004, 2008; Russo & Williamson, 2007; Illari, 2011; Clarke et al., 2014). 
This distinction is nicely expressed by Steel as follows:
On the positive side, we can infer that X is a cause of Y if we know that there is a mechanism 
through which X influences Y. The negative flip side is that if no plausible mechanism running 
from X to Y can be conceived of, then it is safe to conclude that X does not cause Y, even if the 
two variables are probabilistically dependent. (Steel, 2004, p. 56)
This distinction has a prominent place in the analysis of the importance of evidence of 
mechanisms for establishing causal claims. It helps to accurately identify the strengths 
and weaknesses of evidence of mechanisms. In fact, some authors have argued that one 
aspect of evidence of mechanisms’ contribution is actually helpful while the other is not. 
For example, regarding establishing causal claims in the social sciences, Steel claims that 
the positive role is significant, but the negative role “is undermined by the ease of imag-
ining plausible mechanisms that could link nearly any two macrolevel social variables” 
(2008, p. 196).
A distinction between a positive and a negative role of evidence of mechanisms in 
causal extrapolation could also be made. It could be formulated as follows. On the pos-
itive side, if the relevant mechanisms at work in the study and the target population are 
highly similar in the relevant aspects, the extrapolation of the causal claim is justified. On 
the negative side, if the relevant mechanisms at work in the study and the target popula-
tion differ in relevant aspects, the extrapolation of the causal claim is not justified. This 
claim does not entail that the causal relation does not hold in the target population or 
that the causal claim could not be legitimately extrapolated to the target population 
from another study population. It just means that, given the relevant differences between 
the mechanisms at work in the two populations, it is ungrounded to infer that the causal 
relation holds in the target population from the fact that it holds in the current study 
population.
It should be noted that the positive side is nearly gradual, while the negative is not. 
The more similarities are known between the relevant aspects of the relevant mechanisms 
in the two populations, the more justified is the extrapolation (Williamson, 2019). How-
ever, one relevant difference between them is enough for considering that the extrapolation 
is not justified. Even if the relevant difference (and its influence on the causal relationship) 
were known in detail, the extrapolation of the causal claim would hardly be legitimate. Cer-
tainly, in that scenario, it may be possible to infer the causal relationship held in the target 
population. But, given the relevant dissimilarity, the particular causal claim established in 
the study population could not be extrapolated to the target population.
The idea that evidence of mechanisms can support or undermine the extrapolation of 
a causal claim is not entirely new. Some authors have recently referred to it (e.g.  Howick 
et al., 2013a, p. 85; Aronson et al., 2018, p. 1172; Parkkinen et al., 2018, p. 12). Neverthe-
less, the two roles of evidence of mechanisms have never been analysed in depth nor taken 
into account for evaluating the relevance of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapola-
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tion. 10 We think that, as it was the case with the establishment of causal claims, clearly 
distinguishing between the positive and the negative scenarios and considering them sep-
arately could shed light on the appropriate role of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrap-
olation.
3.1. The negative role
In the first place, the negative role of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation will 
be considered. The basic idea is that if the relevant mechanisms at work in the study and 
the target population differ in relevant aspects, the extrapolation is not justified. In order 
to evaluate the actual relevance of the negative role, three aspects will be considered: (i) the 
availability of a procedure for obtaining the necessary information about the relevant 
mechanisms, (ii) how it is affected by the shortcomings encountered by the mechanisms 
approach, and (iii) the number and diversity of real cases that exemplify it.
Regarding the first aspect, it seems that a procedure for obtaining the information re-
quired for the negative mechanism-based inference is available. Consider comparative pro-
cess tracing, which is supported by several advocates of the mechanistic framework (e.g. 
Steel, 2008; Clarke et al., 2014). According to this procedure, firstly, the relevant mecha-
nisms in the study population must be carefully scrutinised by means of process tracing or 
other methods. And secondly, the relevant mechanisms in the study and the target popu-
lation must be compared in those stages in which the two are more likely to significantly 
differ. This procedure could provide the required information. Comparing the relevant 
mechanisms in both populations in those stages in which they are more likely to differ may 
result in the identification of a relevant difference between them. Moreover, the necessary 
knowledge to use this procedure is usually available. Comparative process tracing does not 
presuppose a detailed knowledge about the relevant mechanisms in the study and the tar-
get population. In order to identify a relevant difference by means of this procedure, it is 
only required to have knowledge about likely dissimilarities between mechanisms in both 
populations. Certainly, very often not all the stages in which relevant mechanisms are likely 
to differ are known. Nonetheless, that knowledge is not necessary for comparative process 
tracing to provide the information required for the negative mechanism-based inference. 
Given that not all relevant differences between the relevant mechanisms must be identi-
fied (it is only required to identify at least one relevant difference), knowing some stages in 
which they are likely to differ may be enough.
10 There are authors who have both considered the diversity of roles of evidence of mechanisms and dis-
cussed the relevance of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation. Nevertheless, none of them 
have analysed the diverse roles of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation. Their considerations 
about the diversity of roles of evidence of mechanisms refer to other issues (e.g. to establish a causal 
claim in a study population) and are not introduced in the discussion about causal extrapolation. For 
example, Steel (2004) distinguishes between a positive and a negative role of evidence of mechanisms 
to establish a causal claim in a study population. As it has been noted, that distinction acts as guide in 
his discussion of the importance of evidence of mechanisms to establish a causal claim. However, when 
Steel (2008) addresses the relevance of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation, he does not 
distinguish between different roles for evidence of mechanisms. Actually, in the development of com-
parative process tracing, the diversity of roles of evidence of mechanisms is not taken into account.
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The negative role of evidence of mechanisms is not severely undermined by those ob-
jections commonly raised against the mechanisms approach. Although they affect it, the 
negative role is still operative. One of the main shortcomings is the fragmentary knowl-
edge about the mechanisms at work in both populations (Reiss, 2010; Howick et al., 2013a, 
2013b; van Eersel et al., 2019). Even when a mechanism is identified in a population, the 
knowledge about it is frequently very limited. In particular, it is extremely difficult to fix 
mechanisms’ boundaries, i.e., identifying all their component entities and activities. Nev-
ertheless, it is possible to identify a relevant difference between the mechanisms at work 
in the two populations in this scenario. Even if not all the mechanisms’ component enti-
ties and activities are known, a relevant difference between them may be identified. For 
instance, although there were significant gaps in our understanding of how a particular 
compound is metabolised by humans and mice, it would be possible to identify a relevant 
difference between their metabolic mechanisms. As it has been noted, the identification of 
all the relevant differences is not required in the negative scenario.
Another difficulty faced by the mechanistic stance, which has already been introduced 
in subsection 2.3, is masking (Clarke et  al., 2013, 2014; van Eersel et  al., 2019). Even if 
some mechanisms are identified and scrutinised in a target population, there may be un-
known mechanisms that affect the outcome and, eventually, mask their influence. None-
theless, masking is not especially threatening for the negative role of evidence of mecha-
nisms. Admittedly, some disturbing mechanisms may go unnoticed. However, it is unlikely 
the case that, because of their influence, the negative mechanism-based inference leads to a 
wrong conclusion. Imagine that a relevant difference is identified between the mechanisms 
at work in the study and the target population and, consequently, it is concluded that the 
extrapolation is not justified. The presence of unnoticed disturbing mechanisms in the tar-
get population would only undermine that conclusion if those mechanisms operated so 
that they exactly compensated the identified difference. And that exact counterbalance 
is highly unlikely given the complexity —e.g., a high density of interactions among their 
components— of most biological and social mechanisms (Wagenaar, 2007; Howick et al., 
2010; Howick, 2011; Andersen, 2012).
A third important problem for the mechanisms approach is that mechanisms might 
not behave regularly (Howick et al., 2010, 2013b; van Eersel et al., 2019). As it has been 
argued in subsection 2.3, similar mechanisms may be present in the study and the target 
population but not behave in a similar way. As in the case of masking, mechanisms’ possi-
ble absence of regularity is not very jeopardizing for the negative role. Surely, mechanisms 
may not behave in the target population as in the study population. However, this absence 
of regularity would hardly undermine the conclusion of the negative mechanism-based in-
ference. Imagine that a relevant difference is identified between the mechanisms at work in 
the study and the target population and, therefore, it is concluded that the extrapolation 
is not justified. The irregular behaviour of a/some mechanism/s in the target population 
would only undermine that conclusion if it exactly compensated the identified relevant dif-
ference. Again, given the complexity of the studied mechanisms, it is very unlikely.
Finally, there have been identified many, and diverse, real cases where relevant differ-
ences between the mechanisms at work in the study and the target population undermined 
(or would have undermined) causal extrapolation. Some prominent examples are, in med-
icine, the non-recommendation of streptomycin therapy by the Medical Research Council 
in the 1940s (Clarke et al., 2014); in evidence-based policy, the failure of the Bangladesh 
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Integrated Nutrition Program (Cartwright, 2012); and, in drug approval, the disallowance 
of abaloparatide by the European Medicines Agency (Aronson et al., 2018).
To conclude, evidence of mechanisms can provide a basis for concluding that the ex-
trapolation of a causal claim is not justified. As it has been discussed, a procedure for ob-
taining the necessary information is available, it is not severely affected by the difficulties 
faced by the mechanistic framework, and many and diverse real cases exemplify it. The neg-
ative role of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation is so vindicated.
3.2. The positive role
Let us turn to the positive role of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation. Accord-
ing to it, if the relevant mechanisms at work in the study and the target population are 
highly similar in the relevant aspects, the extrapolation of the causal claim is justified. In or-
der to evaluate the actual relevance of the positive role, the three abovementioned aspects 
(i.e. availability of a procedure, difficulties faced by mechanism-based approaches, and real 
cases that exemplify it) will be considered.
With regard to the first aspect, it is not clear whether a procedure for obtaining the in-
formation required for the inference of the positive scenario is available. Specifying the de-
gree of similarity between the relevant mechanisms at work in the study and the target pop-
ulation is a challenging question for comparative process tracing, the procedure suggested 
by advocates of the mechanism-based approach. In the first place, in order to specify the 
degree of similarity, that procedure requires knowing all (or, at least, most) stages in which 
significant differences between relevant mechanisms are likely to occur. However, previous 
knowledge about similarities and differences between populations is typically insufficient 
for identifying all (or most of) those stages (Reiss, 2010; Howick et al., 2013a, 2013b; van 
Eersel et al., 2019). In particular, knowledge about the target population is often remarka-
bly incomplete. It is worth mentioning that, in some cases, that population does not even 
exist yet. And, provided that we manage to identify all the stages in which populations are 
likely to differ, there would be too many to compare and comparison of all (or most) of 
them would require a vast amount of resources and time. On account of this, Steel (2008, 
p. 90) has proposed a shortcut for making that comparison feasible. He claims that, when 
several stages of likely difference are upstream of another with respect to the causal chain, 
it may be enough to compare the downstream stage.11 However, that circumvention can 
rarely be used. Steel warns that, in order to take advantage of the shortcut, two require-
ments must be satisfied: (i) there must not be a path that bypasses the downstream stage 
and (ii) the upstream stages must leave a distinctive mark upon the downstream stage. Oth-
erwise, some relevant differences between the mechanisms at work in the study and the tar-
get population may go unnoticed. Nevertheless, given the fragmentary knowledge about 
relevant mechanisms, it is often impossible to confirm whether the requirements specified 
by Steel are fulfilled.
11 Steel (2008) argues that comparing two causal chains in their latest stage of likely difference can reveal 
whether there is a significant dissimilarity between them in any stage of likely difference. Dissimilar-
ities in upstream stages result in divergences regarding downstream stages. Consequently, any signifi-
cant dissimilarity in a stage of likely difference, no matter where it is located, should manifest in that 
downstream stage.
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Concerning the difficulties usually encountered by the mechanisms approach, unlike 
the negative role, the positive role seems to be seriously undermined by them. Firstly, con-
sider the limited knowledge about the relevant mechanisms at work in the study and the 
target populations (Howick et al., 2013a, 2013b; van Eersel et al., 2019). Unfortunately, 
in many cases it is extremely difficult to fix the relevant mechanisms’ boundaries and iden-
tify all their components. This situation poses a major challenge to the positive role. If only 
some components of the relevant mechanisms are known, it is very complicated to properly 
compare and establish if there is a high degree of similarity between them. That compari-
son is hardly feasible unless all (or most) components of relevant mechanisms are known. 
Secondly, think about the masking problem (Clarke et al., 2014; van Eersel et al., 2019). It 
also represents an obstacle for the positive role. Even if several relevant mechanisms were 
identified and scrutinised in both populations and it was confirmed that they are highly 
similar, there could be unknown mechanisms in the target population that influence the 
outcome. Those unknown disturbing mechanisms would modify the causal relationship 
held and, consequently, the extrapolation of the causal claim established in the study pop-
ulation would be erroneous. And thirdly, consider the absence of regularity (Howick et al., 
2010, 2013b; van Eersel et al., 2019). It undermines the positive role of evidence of mech-
anisms too. Even if the relevant mechanisms at work in the study and the target popula-
tion are highly similar, they may behave differently in the target population. That change 
in their behaviour would modify the causal relationship held in the target population. As 
a consequence, the extrapolation of the causal claim established in the study population 
would be mistaken.
Most advocates of the mechanistic framework consider that evidence of mechanisms 
should be complemented with statistical evidence (Russo & Williamson, 2007; Clarke 
et al., 2013, 2014; Parkkinen et al., 2018).12 Statistical evidence is considered an adequate 
resource to address the main weaknesses of evidence of mechanisms. Consequently, it 
could be argued that the aforementioned contentions would not be a threat as long as evi-
dence of mechanisms is properly used (i.e. in conjunction with statistical evidence). Com-
plementing mechanism-based extrapolation with statistical evidence would enable us to 
overcome them. Nonetheless, that approach faces some relevant difficulties.
In the first place, statistical evidence could hardly mitigate certain problems of mecha-
nism-based causal extrapolation. For example, statistical evidence could not help with the 
lack of knowledge about the relevant mechanisms. Statistical evidence is evidence about 
whether and to what extent the effect varies with the postulated cause, not about the exist-
ence or the properties of mechanisms in the relevant domain (Illari, 2011). As it has been 
noted (see footnote 5), the distinction between statistical evidence and evidence of mech-
anisms is precisely a distinction about objects of evidence. Consequently, by definition, 
statistical evidence could hardly increase our knowledge about the relevant mechanisms. 
Statistical evidence would also be of little help to address the absence of a procedure for ob-
taining the information required for the inference in the positive scenario.
12 It should be noted that not all advocates of the mechanistic standpoint consider that evidence of 
mechanisms by itself cannot justify the extrapolation of a causal claim and must always be comple-
mented. For example, Steel (2008) argues that evidence of mechanisms alone can adequately guide the 
extrapolation of a causal claim. Nevertheless, he admits that the mechanistic framework cannot always 
be applied.
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Secondly, although statistical evidence could be helpful in order to overcome some 
problems faced by mechanism-based causal extrapolation, researchers can rarely benefit 
from its assistance. Certainly, statistical evidence could address the problem of masking 
(Clarke et al., 2013, 2014). It measures the overall causal effect (i.e. the net outcome) in the 
target population and reveals if there are disturbing mechanisms that modify the causal re-
lation. Likewise, statistical evidence could mitigate mechanisms’ absence of regularity. By 
means of studying what happens overall, it identifies if the behaviour of the mechanisms 
as a whole is the same (i.e. they produce the same net outcome) in the study and the tar-
get population. Nonetheless, quite often the aid of statistical evidence is not available in 
causal extrapolation. Extrapolating causal claims is particularly relevant when we have lim-
ited access to the population of interest. We attempt to extrapolate a causal claim to the 
target population of interest from a different study population precisely because we cannot 
directly study the target population. Needless to say that if we had full access to the popu-
lation of interest and could directly study it, we would focus on identifying the causal rela-
tionship held in that population (not on extrapolating a certain causal claim from a differ-
ent population).13 The reasons of our limited access to the target population can be ethical, 
economic, political, technological, etc. For example, we attempt to extrapolate the effect of 
a nutrition policy in European children living now and in the future from its past effect in 
a particular French town because we cannot directly study all the current and future Euro-
pean children. This means that, when causal extrapolation is concerned, statistical evidence 
about the causal relation in the target population is usually very scarce and can hardly miti-
gate the aforementioned problems.
Lastly, there have been identified several real cases where a high degree of similar-
ity between the relevant mechanisms at work in the study and the target population sup-
ported (or would have supported) causal extrapolation. Some notorious examples are re-
lated to animal models: the extrapolation of the carcinogenic effects of aflatoxin B1 from 
rats to humans (Steel, 2008), of the causal relation between cholesterol-rich diet and ath-
erosclerosis from rabbits to humans (Gillies, 2018), and of the carcinogenic effects of ben-
zo[a]pyrene from animals to humans (Wilde & Parkkinen, 2019). Nonetheless, there are 
fields of science where real cases that exemplify the positive scenario are hard to find. For 
example, few real examples of positive mechanism-based inferences are known in the so-
cial sciences (Reiss, 2010; van Eersel et al., 2019). Steel (2008), after analysing several real 
cases of extrapolation in the social sciences, acknowledges that he could not find any one 
that exemplifies it. Furthermore, the main case study in support of the mechanisms ap-
proach in the social sciences—i.e., the study of the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Pro-
gram—supports the negative role of evidence of mechanisms, but not the positive one 
(Howick et al., 2013b).
Summing up, the actual relevance of the positive role of evidence of mechanisms in 
causal extrapolation is uncertain. Although in principle that sort of support is possible, a 
procedure for obtaining the required information is rarely available and positive mecha-
nism-based inferences are significantly affected by the difficulties faced by the mechanisms 
13 By “full access to the population of interest”, we allude to a scenario in which several experimental or 
quasi-experimental studies could be developed, so that compelling evidence about the existence of the 
causal relationship at issue in that population could be ascertained. 
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approach. Moreover, although there are several real cases that exemplify it, they are ex-
tremely hard to find in some fields of science.
4. Conclusion
Extrapolating a causal claim from a study population to another population of interest is a 
controversial issue. The standard statistical approach, which relies on RCTs or, in their ab-
sence, on quasi-experimental designs, is not devoid of difficulties. The response to an inter-
vention may vary from one individual (or group of individuals) to another and differences 
in the respective contexts of both populations are not always neutral regarding the ex-
pected outcome. Accordingly, some scientists and philosophers of science have argued that 
evidence of mechanisms is indispensable for causal extrapolation. However, we have tried 
to show that evidence of mechanisms is not necessary for dealing with the heterogeneity 
of responses and that it is not less sensitive to contextual variance than statistical evidence. 
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that evidence of mechanisms is irrelevant or 
useless for causal extrapolation. In order to identify the proper role of evidence of mech-
anisms in causal extrapolation, we have introduced a distinction between a positive and a 
negative role. In our view, evidence of mechanisms can support or undermine the extrap-
olation of a causal claim from the study population to the target population. In particular, 
while the positive role is highly questionable, the negative role is reliable and valuable for 
causal extrapolation.
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